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REPLY 
In an effort to excuse the trial court's failure to follow the holdings of Barrett 
and Evans, Defendants propose several arguments which have no support in the history and 
facts of the case, such as the argument that Plaintiffs could have asked Barrett and Evans 
voir dire of individual jurors in the judge's chambers, or that the voir dire conducted by the 
court compensated for its failure to give Barrett and Evans voir dire. 
Notwithstanding Defendants' efforts, the fact remains that Plaintiffs were not 
allowed to discover prospective jurors' exposure to negative reports about medical 
negligence cases, including reports near the time of trial that physicians were being forced 
from the practice of medicine by such cases and skyrocketing insurance rates. Prospective 
juror prejudices from such negative reports remained a complete unknown and Plaintiffs' 
ability to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges was substantially impaired, as 
was Plaintiffs' ability to challenge prospective jurors for cause. Contrary to Defendants' 
assertion, the jury impaneled in the case appears to have been swayed by such prejudices in 
reaching their decision. 
Having failed to justify the trial court's refusal to follow stare decisis and abide 
by Barrett and Evans, Defendants resort to asking the court to modify Utah law so as to leave 
to a trial court the decision whether Barrett and Evans voir dire is necessary. This would be 
a severe blow to justice in medical negligence cases, just as it was to the fairness of the trial 
in the matter at bar. The court should protect and maintain the wisdom and validity of 
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Barrett and Evans and, thus, the right to a fair trial for plaintiffs in medical negligence cases. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS9 "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
The court should strike, or, at least, disregard Defendants' "Statement of Facts" 
(SoF), Nos. 1-6, since the statements are not supported by citation to testimony or other 
evidence presented to the jury. Rather, Defendants cite statements and arguments made in 
their motion for summary judgment (see SoF Nos. 1-6), which were not admitted into 
evidence, but were, along with Defendants'motion, rejected by the court. R. 329, 339-40. 
Contrary to Defendants' unsupported assertions, the evidence in the case 
establishes that Plaintiff Cresencio Alcazar did suffer major, permanent heart damage as a 
result of a heart attack, which Defendants could, and in the exercise of standard care, should 
have averted. See R. 559, pp. 1-51. Defendants failed to consider cardinal signs and 
symptoms of an impending heart attack, including severe, intermittent left chest pain and 
shortness of breath, and sent Mr. Alcazar home without a diagnosis or treatment. Id. 
The court should also strike or disregard Defendants' SoF Nos. 14,15,21,26, 
29, 30, 32, 33,34, and 35, which contain argument and cite the trial court's self-assessments 
and conclusions about the voir dire it conducted in denying Plaintiff's motion for new trial. 
Finally, Plaintiffs note that Defendants' record citation does not support their 
assertion in SoF No. 19, that counsel asked follow-up questions to the venire. This is 
incorrect, as the court did not allow the lawyers to question the venire. R. 758, pp. 2-68. 
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POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT MODIFY THE HOLDINGS OF 
BARRETT AND EVANS TO EXCUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ERROR. BARRETT AND EVANS WERE AND ARE 
ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARDS TO A FAIR MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE TRIAL. 
Defendants ask the Utah Court of Appeals to condone the trial court's refusal 
to follow stare decisis in the case at bar by modifying its holdings in Barrett and Evans, so 
as to leave to a trial court the discretion whether to voir dire prospective jurors on their 
exposure to negative reports about medical negligence lawsuits. This would be a blow to 
justice, as it was to Plaintiffs ability to secure a fair trial in the matter at bar. 
Due to negative reporting in the media about medical negligence cases, Barrett 
and Evans established the right of plaintiffs in such cases to discover the exposure of 
prospective jurors to such reports, so that plaintiffs can intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges, as well as identify prospective jurors who should be disqualified for cause: 
In light of the pervasive dissemination of tort-reform information, and 
the corresponding potential for general exposure to such information by 
potential jurors, a plaintiff is entitled to know which potential jurors, if 
any, have been so exposed. Plaintiff is entitled to such information 
absent any particular showing of specific campaigns, advertisements, 
or literature offered for the purpose of showing potential prejudice. 
Failure to ask such questions ignores the plaintiffs "need to gather 
information to assist in exercising . . . peremptory challenges." 
We hold only that in cases such as this one, the plaintiff is entitled 
during voir dire to elicit information from prospective jurors as to 
whether they have read or heard information generally on medical 
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negligence or tort reform, and to follow up with appropriate questions 
if affirmative responses are received. 
In tort cases, and more particularly in medical malpractice cases, we 
cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors may have developed 
tort-reform biases as a result of an overall exposure to such propaganda. 
Accordingly, in cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a legitimate 
interest in discovering which jurors may have read or heard information 
generally on medical negligence or tort reform. . . . 
Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda may foster a 
subconscious bias within certain prospective jurors, and, had [plaintiff] 
been able to identify those jurors exposed to such propaganda, she 
could have more intelligently exercised her peremptory challenges. 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 
467(Utah Ct. App. 1991). (citations omitted). 
Defendants have not attempted to show any change in circumstances that 
would make the holdings in Barrett and Evans less relevant at the time of trial of the matter 
at bar. If anything, these holdings were more important to a fair trial at that time, since there 
had been a rash of recent reports of physicians being forced from the practice of medicine, 
particularly by dramatic increases in insurance rates supposedly occasioned by verdicts in 
medical negligence cases. R. 560, pp. 9:11-14, R. 360, No. 5. Due to such reports, Plaintiffs 
persisted, even at the expense of incurring the court's frustration, in requesting Barrett and 
Evans voir dire after the trial court's initial rejection: 
MR. RATY: Could I - and I don't want to argue with you on this 
point, Your Honor -
THE COURT: Well then don't. 
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MR.RATY: Then don't? Can I say one last thing. 
THE COURT: If you want to make a record, go ahead. 
MR. RATY: Okay, just very briefly, I think there's a fine balance 
between suggesting things to the jury pool and discovering prejudices 
and biases, which would allow us to intelligently exercise our 
peremptory challenges, and / think that case law, Your Honor, and 
I've cited several of those cases, support the need, especially in our 
present climate so much discussion about doctors going out of 
business because of medical malpractice cases 
R. 560, pp. 9:2-14 
Nevertheless, Defendants assert that a trial court is generally given broad 
discretion in the management of voir dire, and argue that such broad discretion should be 
extended to a decision whether to apply the holdings of Barrett and Evans in a given case. 
While a trial court does generally enjoy broad discretion during voir dire, the Court of 
Appeals noted, in Barrett, that such discretion "must be exercised in favor of allowing 
discovery of biases or prejudice in prospective jurors." Id. at 98, (citing State v. Hall, 191 
P.2d470,472 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990) and State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781,797-98 (Utah 1991). The court then held that in medical negligence cases, as noted 
above, the trial court must allow plaintiffs to discover what exposure prospective jurors' have 
experienced to negative reports of medical negligence cases. Barrett, at 101. 
The trial judge, regardless of his experience, was in no position to reject the 
holdings, the authority, and the collective wisdom of the Utah Court of Appeals. Also, he 
was not in some advantaged position compared to the Utah Court of Appeals, that would give 
need for exercise of discretion. The trial court could not know whether prospective jurors 
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had been exposed to medical negligence reports, without asking them at least some initial 
questions. 
Barrett and Evans stand as sentinels to fair medical malpractice trials in Utah 
and must not be removed. They were as important to the trial of the matter at bar as they 
were to trials at the time of Barrett and Evans. They likewise appear to be as important 
today, especially given ongoing negative reports and exploitation by politicians of the 
apparent widespread societal prejudice such reports have created. The court should, 
therefore, reinforce their validity by holding that the trial court erred in choosing not to 
follow them. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED 
THEIR RIGHT TO THE INFORMED EXERCISE OF 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, NOT BECAUSE OF ALLEGED 
JUROR COMMENTS MADE AFTER TRIAL. 
Referring to comments allegedly made by the jury after the trial, Defendants 
argue that the trial court's error was harmless and that no new trial should be ordered. 
Specifically, Defendants refer to statements made by the trial court at the hearing on 
Plaintiffs' motion for new trial, to the effect that the court believed that the jury ruled in 
Defendants' favor because they rejected plaintiff's expert. The statements to which 
Defendants refer arose in response to Plaintiffs' explanation to the trial court why they 
believed that the trial had not been fair, and why they were appealing the case: 
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MR. RATY: . . . [T]he one bone of contention I had with you and I 
brought this up with you before the trial started and you and I had a 
philosophical difference on this issue, was whether we needed to delve 
into the exposure of these jurors to tort reform [and] medical 
malpractice issues, and when I spoke with the jurors after the trial, I had 
a big concern that they did have those kinds of prejudices. I thought I 
was going to prevail, I thought we put on a very convincing case and I 
was dumbfounded that they hadn't found in our favor. Maybe that's 
just because I'm on this side of the table, but in speaking with the jurors 
afterwards, that was the impression I got, that they had been exposed 
and [had] some deep seeded feelings about suing doctors and hospitals 
and so in that regard I didn't feel that things turned out fair. 
I was more concerned with the danger of not addressing those issues 
more in depth because there are a lot of people in our country and in 
our community who believe it's wrong to sue doctors and hospitals and 
like I said, I really felt like you gave me the fairest trial, except for this 
one issue, that I've ever had, and I had no plans on appealing this case 
until I went back and talked to the jurors, which I think you gave us an 
opportunity to do after their verdict -
THE COURT: I mean, I don't disapprove of it. It's up to the jury if 
they want to talk to you. It's their opportunity that they give to you. 
MR. RATY: And they were here and stayed and were happy to talk 
and just through my discussion with them, I really felt strongly that 
there were some prejudices against these kinds of lawsuits on the jury, 
particularly the jury foreperson, who was very opinionated and seemed 
to have - to me through my questioning of her, seemed she persuaded 
the other jurors that this wasn't right to sue hospitals and doctors. So 
that's the only bone of contention I have with -
THE COURT: I mean, I'm sure you're entitled to raise whatever 
concerns you have in an appeal context. I don't know how you get that 
in front of the appeals court in an appropriate way. I don't know how 
you do that frankly but I guess your impression of the jury's take on it 
was different from what they told me afterward and I don't think I'm 
revealing any confidence or anything because I was told by the bailiff 
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afterward that they said the same thing to the lawyers. But that was 
they basically rejected the testimony of plaintiff s expert and felt he was 
not a good expert and that was the telling thing. So again, this is all 
anecdotal, it's you know hearsay, upon hearsay, upon hearsay and I 
don't think anything like that get[s] to the appellate court. . . . 
MR. RATY: Now I agree, you asked some other things and were 
thorough in other areas of voir dire but on this very hot button issue in 
our society today about doctors and nurses being driven out of the 
practice of medicine, we didn't get into anything about what they had 
heard or read. I asked you [to] give those kinds of questions and I 
appreciate your philosophy and I understand it, that you think it will do 
more harm than good to ask those kinds of questions. I differ with that 
philosophy. I think there's been so much dissemination and there is 
such wide prejudice on this issue, that that is why the Court of Appeals 
has said I have an absolute right to ask the kind of questions I submitted 
to the Court. 
R. 769, 11:22 -12:10, 13:16-24,14:3-23, 60:13-61:14. 
In touting the statements of the trial court about its understanding that the jury 
had rejected plaintiffs expert and felt that he was not a good expert, Defendants ignore that 
such statements are entirely consistent with prejudices and biases expressed by the jury about 
their distaste for lawsuits against doctors and hospitals. A jury that has biases in favor of 
doctors and hospitals and against medical negligence cases would tend to reject the plaintiff s 
expert who is critical of the care they provided. 
In any event, as rightly noted by the trial court, such discussion is anecdotal, 
is hearsay, and should not have been raised by the Defendants on the appeal. As previously 
explained by the Utah Court of Appeals, one can never know what would have happened, 
-8-
had the trial court asked the proper questions, and so, the standard for reversal is whether the 
party's right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been substantially 
impaired: 
An appellant claiming that the trial court's unreasonable limitation of 
voir dire substantially impaired his ability to exercise peremptory 
challenges simply cannot prove, in the traditional way, that prejudice 
resulted from the error. Appellant cannot show with any certainty that 
had certain questions been asked, particular responses would have been 
received; that certain jurors would then have been challenged for cause 
or peremptorily; and that particular, more favorably predisposed jurors 
would have been seated instead, who would have deliberated to a 
different result. Accordingly, in this context, we apply the test 
enunciated in Hornsby: Prejudicial error is shown if the appellant's right 
to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been 
"substantially impaired." 758 P.2d at 933. 
Barrett, at 103. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFFS TO 
QUESTION PROSPECTIVE JURORS IN CHAMBERS ON 
THEIR EXPOSURE TO NEGATIVE REPORTS OF MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE CASES. 
Defendants argue that the trial court did not err because Plaintiffs were given, 
but failed to take advantage of, the opportunity to bring each of the 35 prospective jurors into 
the Judge's chambers and individually ask them Barrett and Evans questions. This is a false 
argument, which has no support in the record. To the contrary, the court rejected all of 
Plaintiffs' Barrett and Evans requested voir dire, including the voir dire questions designated 
"in chambers" and submitted to the court. R. 359-362, Question Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, and 
their sub-parts; R. 560, pp. 3-7. 
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After the court rejected Plaintiffs Barrett and Evans voir dire, Plaintiffs 
attempted to persuade the court to reconsider, but to no avail: 
MR. RATY: Okay, and then, Your Honor, on the first, first part 
questions, which get at prejudice regarding medical malpractice cases. 
THE COURT: I don't know that they get into prejudice. I think they 
end up raising issues that most people don't know about and, and it 
makes, and suggests things to people that they may not have considered 
and I think the suggestions are not appropriate, so that's why I don't 
give them. 
R. 560, pp. 7:24-8:10. The court then added, 
So I'm, as I said before, when I talked to you before about your voir 
dire questions that there's certain questions that I just don't give that I 
think are calculated to influence the jury or to kind of till the soil for 
you to sow seeds and I know a lot of lawyers like to do that and I think 
there are probably seminars that tell you how to do that and I'm just 
telling you that in this case, and other cases that you might have with 
me in the future, I won't do that. 
R. 560, pp. 8:18-9:1. The court thus made clear its view that Plaintiffs' proposed voir dire 
was an improper attempt to influence jurors, and that it was not going to allow Plaintiffs to 
ask their Barrett and Evans questions. 
Knowing where the court stood, but also knowing that Plaintiffs needed to 
know about the prospective jurors' exposure, Plaintiffs attempted a third time to persuade the 
court to allow Barrett and Evans questioning: 
MR. RATY: Could I - and I don't want to argue with you on this 
point, Your Honor -
THE COURT: Well then don't. 
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MR. RATY: Then don't? Can I say one last thing. 
THE COURT: If you want to make a record, go ahead. 
MR. RATY: Okay, just very briefly, I think there's a fine balance 
between suggesting things to the jury pool and discovering prejudices 
and biases, which would allow us to intelligently exercise our 
peremptory challenges, and I think that case law, Your Honor, and I've 
cited several of those cases, support the need, especially in our present 
climate so much discussion about doctors going out of business because 
of medical malpractice cases 
THE COURT: I mean do you want to tell the panel, are you worried 
about doctors going out of business because of medical malpractice? 
Is that the kind of thought you want to put in their mind? 
MR RATY: Well, what I'm afraid of is this -
THE COURT: You want to put in their mind that your medical costs 
are going to go up because of, you know, it's like saying to a kid don't 
put beans in your ears, you know, they're going to say, "Hey, that's an 
idea", you know, and that's what you're doing, and I think it can hurt 
the plaintiff as much as it can hurt the defendant and it makes, it creates 
kind of a random damage outcome that you can't predict, and again 
I've seen enough juries over the last 40 years, that you know, I think I 
know how they generally react and I think in this instance, as I said 
before, you will know which people to challenge peremptorily by the 
time we get to that point. 
R. 560, pp. 9:2-10:6. 
As set forth in the above quotes, the trial court expressed frustration at 
Plaintiffs' persistence, made clear that Plaintiffs were not allowed to ask any Barrett and 
Evans questions so as not to improperly influence the prospective jurors, and expressed its 
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belief that even without Barrett and Evans questioning, Plaintiffs would have sufficient 
information to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges. 
The court explained the mechanics of its voir dire, including that after the 
court's questioning of the venire, the court would ask the parties at sidebar if they had any 
other questions for it to submit to the venire: 
THE COURT: What I'll do at the end of these questions I'll say to you 
come up here. You'll come up and I'll say now are there any questions 
you want to ask that you feel you haven't had a chance to really get a 
reaction, and almost inevitably the lawyers will say no at that point. 
R.560:10:12-16. The court did, in fact, have the parties come to sidebar, and Plaintiffs asked 
for the fourth time for Barrett and Evans questioning, and for the fourth time, was denied. 
R. 650,112. 
The court next explained that it would bring to chambers any jurors that raised 
their hands in response to issues raised in the court's voir dire: 
They sit right behind Mr. Williams and we'd ask them, you know, you 
raised your hand when you, when we asked if there was any reason that 
you felt you might not be able to serve as juror in this case, or whatever 
the issue was, and could you explain that for us and then they'll explain 
it. I might, while they're here, I might turn to you and say do you have 
any questions that you want to ask this particular juror in any more 
detail and so you can ask on those, on those occasions. 
R. 560,13:5-13. 
After having requested four times for the court to allow Barrett and Evans 
questions, and having been rejected all four times, having been told by the court that 
Plaintiffs were not to suggest anything to the jurors by asking such questions, having been 
-12-
told that Plaintiffs would have enough information without asking Barrett and Evans 
questions, and having been told about who would be brought back to chambers and for what 
purpose (i.e. jurors who raised their hands to follow up on responses to the non-Barrett and 
Evans voir dire conducted by the court), it is false to state that Plaintiff was free to bring the 
prospective jurors to chambers and ask them Barrett and Evans questions. 
Defendants note that eighteen of the thirty-five members of the panel were 
brought back for private interviews, but that Plaintiffs' counsel brought in only one panel 
member, a man who had disclosed that his wife worked for a pediatrician's office. See 
Defendants' brief, p. 21. Obviously, the court can see what Plaintiffs' counsel was 
concerned about-bias in favor of doctors and the medical establishment. Plaintiffs' counsel 
asked this prospective juror (who did not sit on the jury) if he had any feelings, either positive 
or negative, about medical negligence cases. R. 758, pp. 115-16. However, since the court 
forbade Barrett and Evans questions, there was not anyone else for Plaintiff to interview. 
POINT IV 
THE VOIR DIRE CONDUCTED BY THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT COMPENSATE FOR ITS FAILURE TO ELICIT THE 
EXPOSURE OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS TO NEGATIVE 
REPORTS OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES. 
Defendants also argue that the voir dire conducted by the court compensated 
for its failure to elicit the exposure of prospective jurors to negative reports about medical 
negligence cases. Defendants argue that the court's voir dire lasted approximately three 
hours and covered many topics. 
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While there are not time notations in the record, the court's in-court voir dire 
was actually short and then the court spent more time following up, as needed, with jurors 
who had responded to the in-court questioning. However, regardless of the length of the voir 
dire, it is the quality, not the quantity, that counts. Voir dire that lasts even a week is 
insufficient, if it does not allow a party to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges. 
Barrett, at 103. 
The material point is that Defendants do not and cannot point to a single 
instance in the record where the court elicited the exposure of the prospective jurors to 
negative reporting of medical negligence cases. There is not such an instance because, as the 
court made abundantly clear and as quoted above, the court's intention, practice, and 
direction to the parties, was to raise no such issues to the jury panel. Even the token "tort 
reform" question asked by the court was couched and handled in a way so as not to reveal 
prospective juror exposure to negative reports about medical negligence cases. The court did 
not ask what the jurors had read, heard, or seen about medical negligence cases, a lawsuit 
crisis, unreasonable jury verdicts, or increasing insurance costs. The court only asked if 
anyone had formed an opinion in favor of or opposed to "tort reform" and then, in response 
to a prospective jurors question about the meaning of the term, said, "I thought we'd get 
questions. If you don't know what it is, you don't need to worry about it, okay?" R. 758, p. 
57:10-16. This in no way satisfies the concerns and requirements of Barrett and Evans. The 
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jury was impaneled by the court without Plaintiffs knowing any of the jurors' exposure to or 
biases and prejudices from negative reports about medical negligence cases. 
Defendants argue that while the court did not give the Barrett and Evans voir 
dire contained in Plaintiffs' Requested Voir Dire Nos. 2, 3, and 5, the trial court did cover 
the matters raised in Plaintiffs' Requested Voir Dire Nos. 1,8,11, and 15, although the court 
also rejected these voir dire questions. While Plaintiffs acknowledge that some of the matter 
was covered through similar questions, the court's rejection of Nos. 1, 8,11, and 15 further 
demonstrate the court's determination not to raise anything specific to medical negligence 
cases, which might generate comments about the topics addressed in Barrett and Evans. 
Finally, Defendants claim that the matter at bar is more akin to Evans, where 
the trial court's error was found harmless, than Barrett, where the trial court's judgment was 
reversed. However, Defendants ignore the discussion in Plaintiffs' principal brief, 
demonstrating that the case at bar is, in all material respects, like Barrett. The bottom line 
is that in the matter at bar, just as in Barrett, the trial court asked no meaningful questions 
that would elicit disclosure by prospective jurors of exposure to information on medical 
negligence cases and their effect. On the other hand, in Evans, which the court stated must 
have been a "close call" (Barrett at 103), the court actually mentioned articles and television 
programs to jurors and asked jurors whether they had strong feelings about lawsuits against 
doctors: 
Now, many of you have heard and read articles, and there have been 
television programs, with regard to negligence on the part of doctors. 
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Do any of you have any strong feelings as a result of seeing or reading 
anything about medical negligence that would make it so that you 
couldn't be fair and impartial here today? Now do any of you have any 
strong feelings about anyone bringing a lawsuit against a doctor? 
Evans at 463. 
Since plaintiff in Barrett was not allowed to elicit prospective jurors' exposure to 
medical negligence reports and their effect, nor to follow up with appropriate questions, the 
court reversed the lower court judgment and remanded for a new trial: 
The trial court's failure to ask prospective jurors threshold questions 
sufficient to elicit information on the jurors' possible exposure to 
tort-reform and medical negligence information prevented appellant 
from detecting possible bias and from intelligently exercising his 
peremptory challenges. The trial court's limitation of voir dire 
questioning substantially impaired appellant's right to the informed 
exercise of his peremptory challenges, and therefore constitutes 
reversible error. The judgment in favor of appellee is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for a new trial. 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also, Evans v. Doty, 824 
P.2d 460, 467(Utah Ct. App. 1991). The same reasoning applies to the case at bar. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred and violated stare decisis, by declining to follow the 
holdings of Barrett and Evans. These holdings are essential to fair medical negligence cases 
and should not be modified as requested by Defendants. Plaintiff was not allowed to 
discover the exposure of prospective jurors to negative reports of medical negligence cases, 
including reports of skyrocketing insurance rates and doctors being driven from the practice 
of medicine. The court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and order a new trial, 
since the trial court's error substantially impaired Plaintiffs' right to the informed exercise 
of their peremptory challenges. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 11th day of February, 2008. 
Matthew H. Raty "% 
Attorney for Appellants 
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